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IN MISSOURI CONTRACT LAW1
Tumlinson v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co.2
The meaning of particular words or groups of words varies with
the "verbal context and surrounding circumstances and purposes in
view of the linguistic education and experience of their users and their
hearers or readers (not excluding judges).... Aword has no meaning
apart from these factors; much less does it have an objective meaning,
one true meaning."'
In Tumlinson v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co.,4 the Western
District of the Missouri Court of Appeals recently held that an indemni-
fication contract containing no patent or latent ambiguity still may be
ambiguous if literal application of the contract terms to the facts would
work an absurd result.5 In so holding, the court adopted a minority
view that has been applied in only three other states.6 There are
1. This Note is dedicated to the memory of Professor George I. Wallach, who
sparked this author's interest in the study of contract law.
2. 775 S.W.2d 251 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
3. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 69 Cal.
2d 33, 38, 442 P.2d 641, 644-45, 69 Cal. Rptr. 561, 564-65 (1968) (en banc)
(quoting Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence Rule, 50
CORNELL L. Q. 161, 187 (1965)).
4. 775 S.W.2d 251 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
5. Id. at 253.
6. Fairbanks Morse & Co. v. Twin City Supply Co., 170 N.C. 315, 322, 86
S.E. 1051, 1054 (1915); Sanders v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 180 S.C.
138, 145-46, 185 S.E. 180, 182 (1936); Clappenback v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
136 Wis. 626, 630, 118 N.W. 245, 246 (1908). The rule was also cited in
McCormickv. Phillips Petroleum Co., 114 F. Supp. 167 (D.N.M. 1953), rev'd, 211
F.2d 361 (10th Cir. 1954). Missouri courts have applied the absurdity doctrine
in interpreting and interchanging the words "or" and "and" in contract and
statute. E.g., Ex parte Lockhart, 350 Mo. 1220, 171 S.W.2d 660 (Mo. 1943);
Dean Operations-, Inc. v. Pink Hill Assocs., 678 S.W.2d 897 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
1
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significant problems with the absurdity doctrine as applied in Turn-
linson:. 1) unlike any other state that has adopted the absurdity rule,
the court found an absurd result only after considering hypothetical
facts, not the actual facts of the case,7 2) it allows the court to avoid the
plain meaning rule when that rule clearly applies, and 3) it unwisely
circumvents the doctrine of unconscionability' Most importantly, the
Tumlinson court could have avoided these problems and reached the
same result without applying the absurdity doctrine, and without
compromising well-established precedent. Before analyzing the
absurdity doctrine and its implications, this Note will discuss indemnifi-
cation arising out of an indemnitee's own negligence, the plain meaning
rule, and contract ambiguity. An understanding of this background
material will be crucial to the analysis that follows.
I. FACTS AND HOLDING
In May 1985, Norfolk & Western Railway Co. (Norfolk) contracted
with W. M. Brode Company (Brode) to replace a Norfolk bridge over
Wakenda Creek in Carrol County, Missouri. 9 The contract provided
that Brode was to indemnify and hold Norfolk harmless from all liability
arising out of or connected with construction of the bridge.'
0
The doctrine heretofore was limited to that specific application.
7. Tumlinson, 775 S.W.2d at 254.
8. See id
9. I&
10. The pertinent sections of the contract are as follows:
Section 5.1 Indemnity
Contractor [Brode] shall indemnify and hold harmless the Company
[Norfolk] ... from and against any and all liability... arising from
or in connection with (i) any claims for personal injury and/or property
loss or damage to whomsoever or whatsoever occurring or arising in
any manner out of or in connection with the Work, this Contract, any
act or omission of Contractor, its officers, agent or employees upon or
about the property or premises of Company, whether or not negligence
on the part of Company, its officers, agents or employees, may have
caused or contributed to such injury....
Section 1.4 Definitions
"Work" shall mean all or any part of the Contractor's obligations and
other matters referred to in Section 1.1.
Section 1.1 Work
Except as otherwise provided herein, Contractor shall furnish, at
Contractor's costs, all materials, superintendence, labor, equipment,
tools, supplies, permits, signs and transportation necessary to
618 [Vol. 55
2
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 2 [1990], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss2/6
AMBIGUITY IN MISSOURI CONTRACT LAW
In July 1985, Brode purchased rock from Howard Quarries for
construction of the Norfolk bridge." On July 10, 1985, while trans-
porting the rock from Howard Quarries to the bridge site, Ronald
Tumlinson was injured when a Norfolk train collided with his truck 2.2
miles from the bridge site.12 Tumlinson, the original plaintiff in this
case, filed suit against Norfolk, who filed a third-party petition for
indemnity against Brode.'3  Norfolk settled with Tumlinson before
trial.
14
Norfolk claimed that the construction contract required Brode to
indemnify Norfolk for damages arising "out of or in connection with the
work.' 6 That "work" included the transportation of materials to the
bridge site.'6 Norfolk contended that the language was clear, unambig-
uous, and therefore not subject to interpretation. 7  The trial court
found that the contract was ambiguous. To clarify the ambiguity, the
court allowed W. L. Brode to testify that such indemnity agreements in
the railroad construction industry apply only to the "loss occurring
within the project limits"'--here, the area between the ends of the
bridge and the railroad right-of-way lines. Judgment was entered for
Brode; Norfolk appealed. 9
The Western District of the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed.
2
The court stated that "[tihe words of the indemnity [contract] taken
literally lead to an absurd result which invokes the rule of ambiguity
and which allows the court to construe the contract according to the
intent of the parties."'" The court found that sufficient evidence
existed to support the trial court's ruling that the parties intended the
perform, and Contractor shall perform, construct and complete, the
following work: Contractor shall replace Bridge Number 516 near
Wakenda, MO ....
Id at 251, 253.
11. Howard Quarries hired Alan Wilson, who then hired Ronald Tumlinson,
to transport the rock to the bridge site. Id. at 252.
12. Id
13. Id.
14. Tumlinson and Norfolk settled out of court for $38,000. Norfolk's






19. Id at 251.
20. Id.
21. Id- at 253.
199o]
3
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indemnity clause to apply only within the immediate area of the job
site.2 Therefore, neither Tumlinson's accident, nor Brode's duty to




A. Indemnification of Negligent Indemnitee
Parties can make any contract they wish unless it is forbidden by
law.' It is the parties' responsibility and not the courts' responsibility,
to weigh the costs and benefits of the contract they create.' The
"freedom to contract includes the freedom to make a bad bargain,"'2
and unless fraud is shown, the courts will not grant relief simply
because one party has made such a bargainY Courts have specifically
recognized that a railroad may contract to be indemnified for any
damages that it might incur as a result of its own negligence,2 as long
as the parties to the agreement are on substantially equal footing.2
Courts will strictly construe such contract provisions because they shift
liability away from the negligent party.' ° Most importantly, the
indemnification clause must be expressed in clear and unequivocal
terms.
31
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Fix Fuel & Material Co. v.
Wabash Railroad Co., enforced a contract indemnifying a railroad for
damages that occurred partly as a result of the railroad's own negli-
22. Id
23. Id
24. Roll v. Fidelity Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 115 S.W.2d 148, 150 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1938).
25. Christeson v. Burba, 714 S.W.2d 183, 195 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
26. Id (citing Sanger v. Yellow Cab Co., 486 S.W.2d 477,481-82 (Mo. 1972)
(en banc)).
27. Clark v. Clark, 228 S.W.2d 828, 832 (Mo. Ct. App. 1950) (quoting Pavey
v. London & Provincial Marine & Gen. Ins. Co., 221 Mo. App. 930,935,288 S.W.
788, 791 (1926)).
28. E.g., Terminal R. Ass'n v. Ralston-Purina Co, 352 Mo. 1013, 1018, 180
S.W.2d 693, 696 (1944).
29. Pilla v. Tom-Boy, Inc., 756 S.W.2d 638, 641 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
30. See Bonenberger v. Associated Dry Goods, Co., 738 S.W.2d 598,600 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1987).
31. Pilla, 756 S.W.2d at 641.
[Vol. 55620
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gence.32 The indemnity clause covered "any and all losses... arising
from or growing out of, directly or indirectly, the existence, operation,
use or maintenance of said unloading pit, or its removal."'  The
Eighth Circuit focused on the lack of limiting language in the agreement
and on the clear extension of coverage to "all losses," including those
beyond the work site "arising from or growing out of' the work site
activities.' In addition to the lack of limiting language referred to in
F ix, most courts have required such indemnity clauses to provide
expressly for indemnity when liability arises from an indemnitee's own
negligence.' The reason for this requirement is that most indemnity
contracts are intended to cover losses resulting from events outside the
indemnitee's control or exclusively within the indemnitor's control, and
not from the indemnitee's own negligence.3
In Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. Federal Construction Corp.,37
an indemnity provision covered "any damage arising from accidents,
negligence, or carelessness pertaining to the work."'  The Missouri
Supreme Court refused to extend the indemnitor's obligations in Kansas
City Power & Light to liability caused by the indemnitee because the
clause did not extend indemnification explicitly to situations where the
indemnitee was negligent.' Although the broad provisions could
encompass such liabilities, the failure to expressly provide for indemni-
tee negligence also failed to provide the intent necessary to enforce the
indemnity clause.40 Nevertheless, the court plainly stated that "one
may legally agree to indemnify the other against the results of the
indemnitee's own negligence.4 No Missouri case or statute holds to
the contrary.
32. Fix Fuel & Material Co. v. Wabash R.R Co., 243 F.2d 110, 115 (8th Cir.
1957). The indemnity contract in Fix covered all liabilities that were not caused
solely by the indemnitee. Id- at 111-12. The indemnitee's (Wabash) train struck
and injured the indemnitor's (Fix) employee while the employee was working on
the indemnitee's property. Id. at 112. There was evidence of indemnitee
negligence, but also evidence of the employee's contributory negligence, and
therefore, the indemnitee was able to recover from the indemnitor. Id. at 114-
15.
33. Id. at 111-12.
34. Id. at 112.
35. Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. Federal Constr. Corp., 351 S.W.2d
741, 745 (Mo. 1961); New York Cent. R.R. v. Chicago & E.I.R. Co., 360 Mo. 885,
897, 231 S.W.2d 174, 177 (Mo. 1950).
36. Kansas City Power & Light, 351 S.W.2d at 745.
37. 351 S.W.2d 741 (Mo. 1961).






Hickman: Hickman: Absurdity as an Indication
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
B. The Plain Meaning Rule & Ambiguity
It is clear that Missouri still adheres to the plain meaning rule.
42
The cardinal rule of contract interpretation is to determine the parties'
intent and give it effect.43 Still, a "court will not resort to construction
where the intent of the parties is expressed in clear and unambiguous
language for there is nothing to construe.""4 An ambiguous contract
is one that is "reasonably susceptible of different constructions.,
45
Under the plain meaning rule, a court will look no farther than the
contract and related writings to determine the issue of ambiguity."
This restriction is important because it limits the type of ambiguity that
may overcome the plain meaning rule.
Courts have recognized two major types of ambiguities: patent and
latent.47 Patent ambiguities are those "arising upon the face of the
document."'  Extrinsic evidence is not needed to determine if a
contract is patently ambiguous.49  Therefore, patent ambiguity
precludes application of the plain meaning rule.' Latent ambiguities,
on the other hand, "arise where a writing on its face appears clear and
unambiguous, but there is some collateral matter which makes the
meaning uncertain."5' The essence of the rule is that it does not look
at "collateral matter" outside the writing.5 2  Because a latently
ambiguous contract "appears clear and unambiguous," the plain
42. J.E. Hathman, Inc. v. Sigma Alpha Epsilon Club, 491 S.W.2d 261, 264





47. E.g., Busch & Latta Painting v. State Hwy. Comm'n, 597 S.W.2d 189,




51. Campbell v. Dixon, 647 S.W.2d 617, 621 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (quoting
32A C.J.S. Evidence § 961 (1964)). Raffles v. Wichelshaus, 159 Eng. Rep. 375
(Ex. 1864), may be the most famous case of latent ambiguity. The buyer and
seller of goods entered into a contract for goods to be delivered on the ship
"Peerless." There were, however, two ships called "Peerless," which arrived
months apart. The buyer thought the goods would come on the first, the seller,
of course, intended the second. The contract was not ambiguous on its face, but
because of the unusual extrinsic facts it was rendered latently ambiguous. The
court found that no agreement was reached because of the mutual mistake. Id.
at 376.
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meaning rule is invoked and no extrinsic evidence of such ambiguity
will be considered.'
There may be yet another type of ambiguity. In 1895, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court first applied the rule that "even an apparent-
ly unambiguous contract may be rendered ambiguous and open to
construction if its words, taken literally, lead to absurdity or illegality
when applied to the facts.I 4 This rule permits admission of extrinsic
evidence to clarify the ambiguity, thus creating another exception to the
plain meaning rule. Tumlinson v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co.55 is
the first Missouri case to apply the absurdity rule to find a contract
ambiguous. Until recently, only three other states had applied the
absurdity rule.' No authority, including Tumlinson, has addressed
yet whether the absurdity exception to the plain meaning rule is a type
of latent ambiguity, whether it stands as a separate type of ambiguity,
or whether it is a substitute for the doctrine of unconscionability.57
III. THE INSTANT OPINION
The Tumlinson courtP addressed Norfolk's contention that the
indemnity clause was clear and unambiguous." It did so in the
context of Norfolk's claim that the clause would apply to any accident,
at any location, involving the transportation of materials to the job site,
for which Norfolk could be held liable.6° The court reasoned that if the
indemnity clause was literally applied, Brode could be liable to Norfolk
53. Id
54. Clappenback v. New York Life Ins. Co., 136 Wis. 626,118 N.W. 245,246
(1908); 13 CJ.S. Contracts § 481 (1964). The doctrine can be traced to Gilbert
v. Dutruit, 91 Wis. 661, 665-66 (1895).
55. 775 S.W.2d 251 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
56. Fairbanks Morse & Co. v. Twin City Supply Co., 170 N.C. 315, 322, 86
S.E. 1051, 1054 (1915); Sanders v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 180 S.C.
138, 145-46, 185 S.E. 180, 182 (1936); Clappenback v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
136 Wis. 626, 630, 118 N.W. 245, 246 (1908). The rule was also cited in
McCormick v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 114 F. Supp. 167 (D.N.M. 1953), rev'd, 211
F.2d 361 (10th Cir. 1954).
57. The similarity between the absurdity doctrine and the doctrine of
unconscionability will be addressed infra notes 84-95 and accompanying text.
58. Judge Turnage wrote the majority opinion in which Judge Clark joined.
Judge Fenner dissented. Tumlinson, 775 S.W.2d at 251.
59. Id at 252.
60. The court used Brode's testimony to create a hypothetical situation in
which Brode would be held liable if the indemnity clause were enforced as
written. Under the hypothetical, steel for the project is brought from Ohio via
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for any liabilities incurred from any accident, even though Brode might
not control the negligent acts.6' The majority opinion hypothesized
that if Norfolk incurred liabilities in Ohio while transporting materials
to the bridge site, and if the contract terms were literally applied, then
Brode would be liable.62 The court found this hypothetical outcome
absurd, although it never explicitly said that literally applying the
indemnity clause to the actual facts of the case would work an absurdi-
ty.63
The court cited Sanders v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.,4 for
the proposition that an unambiguous contract is ambiguous if it leads
to absurd results when applied literally to the facts.' An absurdity is
"a result which is contrary to reason or which 'could not be attributed
to a man in his right senses."' The Tumlinson court reasoned that
because no sensible person would agree to such an absurdity, the
indemnity clause must have some meaning other than its literal
meaning. 7 The possible existence of other meanings justified the
courts admitting Brode's testimony about the generally accepted
meaning of the indemnity clause in the railroad industry.' The
majority then reasoned that because W. L. Brode was the only witness
who testified about the meaning of the clause, the trial court properly
could have found in favor of Brode.69 The majority did not discuss the
plain meaning rule, address whether the indemnity clause was latently
or patently ambiguous, or whether the absurdity rule was an indepen-
dent determinant of ambiguity.70
61. Id. This situation is not so unusual. If Brode had contracted with UPS
for transportation of materials to the bridge site, Brode would not control the
loading and transportation procedures of UPS. Yet, Brode might still be liable
for loss incurred as a result of such transportation.
62. Id
63. Id. at 253. The impropriety of the court basing its opinion upon facts
not in issue will not be extensively discussed in this Note. Judge Fenner's
dissent, however, criticized the majority's use of hypothetical facts. Id. at 254.
64. 180 S.C. 188, 145, 185 S.E. 180, 182 (1936).
65. Tumlinson, 755 S.W.2d at 252.
66. Id. at 253 (quoting State v. Hayes, 81 Mo.574,585(1884)). Although the
court never stated that an absurd result would be achieved by literally applying
the contract terms to the facts of the case, it concluded that the Sanders rule
applied to the instant case because: "It is difficult to imagine a more absurd





70. See id. at 251.
[Vol. 55
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The dissent found there was no ambiguity in the indemnity
clause. 1 Judge Fenner contended that the Tumlinson accident clearly
involved "work," defined in the contract as "materials... and transpor-
tation necessary" for replacement of the bridge.7 2 Therefore, the
accident was within the scope of the indemnity clause.73  He also
pointed out that indemnification was to occur "whether or not negligence
on the part of [Norfolk], its officers, agents or employees may have
caused or contributed to the injury."' These clauses, Judge Fenner
contended, showed that the parties did not intend to limit Brode's
indemnification of Norfolk to the job site.75 The contract's plain
language extended to work such as transporting materials to the job
site, as well as to liability incurred as a result of Norfolk's own
negligence. 8  Thus, the indemnity clause was not patently ambigu-
ous.
7 7
Judge Fenner then addressed the issue of latent ambiguity. He
claimed that no latent ambiguity would be created by Brode's indemnifi-
cation of Norfolk. It was reasonable, he thought, that Norfolk would
have sought protection from liability because the proximity of the
crossing to the jobsite caused increased construction traffic at the
crossing.
78
Finally, Judge Fenner stated that the application of Sanders to
Tumlinson did not apply because the instant facts would not have
rendered an absurd result.79 Judge Fenner took issue with the
majority's use of hypothetical facts because, in his words, they had "no
application to the case which actually present[ed] itself."' °
IV. ANALYSIS
The Tumlinson court reached a fair result. If the court had imposed
liability on Brode in this case, it would have worked an undeserved,
inequitable hardship. The dollar value of the Norfolk-Brode contract is








79. Id. at 254. The only absurd result in Tumlinson to which Sanders
would have been applicable was the one posited by the majority in the
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unknown, but it is apparent from the size of the claim 1 that the
liability in this case probably exceeded, or at least constituted a
substantial percentage of the contract amount. The result was fair also
because of the parties' lack of intent for comprehensive indemnification
of Norfolk. The main purpose of the Brode-Norfolk contract was to
construct a bridge over Wakenda Creek. 2 The contract provided for
indemnity of Norfolk, but it was not an insurance policy designed to
cover all possible liabilities.8 If the parties did not even contemplate
an accident like Tumlinson's, they could not have intended to provide
specifically for indemnity under the facts of this case.' Because of this
lack of intent, as well as the inequitable hardship that would have
resulted if Brode were held liable, Tumlinson reached an equitable
result. Still, however fair the end result may have been, the equitable
considerations did not justify the majority's abandonment of sound legal
reasoning.
Many Missouri cases indicate that the Tumlinson application of the
absurdity doctrine circumvents the common law doctrine of unconsciona-
bility. Contracts that provide for indemnity, even when the indemnitee
is the sole proximate cause of the liability, are not unconscionable per
se in Missouri.s5 Thus, there is a presumption of conscionabiity.
Tumlinson circumvented this presumption of conscionability by use of
the absurdity doctrine. The Tumlinson court defined absurdity as "a
result which is contrary to reason or which 'could not be attributed to
a man in his right senses."" The definition of unconscionability is
almost identical: "such as no man in his senses and not under a
delusion would make."87 Courts do not often find contracts unconscio-
81. Norfolk's claim for indemnification was $62,024.91, $24,024.91 of which
were attorney's fees. Id. at 252.
82. Id at 251.
83. Id at 253.
84. Id The majority's hypothetical, although improperly applied to the
terms of the contract, demonstrates that it was unlikely the parties had
intended to indemnify Norfolk for liability arising solely from its own negligence.
85. See, e.g., Colorado Milling & Elevator Co. v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 350
F.2d 273,278 (8th Cir. 1965); Fix Fuel & Material Co. v. Wabash R.R., 243 F.2d
110, 115 (8th Cir. 1957); Pilla v. Tom-Boy,-Inc., 756 S.W.2d 638, 641 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1988).
86. Tumlinson, 775 S.W.2d at 253 (quoting State v. Hayes, 81 Mo. 574, 585
(1884)).
87. Carter v. Boone County Trust Co., 338 Mo. 629, 651, 92 S.W.2d 647, 657
(1935) (en banc) (quoting W. PAGE, PAGE ON CONTRACT § 641 (1st ed. 1905)); see
also Ball v. Reyburn, 136 Mo. App. 546, 549, 118 S.W. 524, 524 (1909) (quoting
Chesterfield v. Janssen, 2 Ves. Sen. 125, 155).
[Vol. 55
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nable, because such a finding is an interference with the parties'
freedom to contract.8
A finding of unconscionability requires a weighing of the freedom of
contract policy considerations against the considerations of preventing
one-sided, inequitable bargains. The TUmlinson court probably could
not justify a finding that the contract was unconscionable. Enforcement
of a contract may be refused only in cases such as failure of consider-
ation, misrepresentation, undue influence, or lack of mutual assent.8 9
The Brode-Norfolk contract had none of these characteristics. Professors
Calamari, and Perillo assert that courts often resort to "imaginative
flanking devices" like the absurdity doctrine to defeat offending
contracts when they are unable to find any standard characteristics of
unconscionability. °  By using the absurdity doctrine as a flanking
device, the Tumlinson court avoided the issue of unconscionability, as
well as an ultimate finding that the Brode-Norfolk contract was not, in
fact, unconscionable.
Tamlinson's result-oriented adoption of the absurdity doctrine may
result in confusion in Missouri contract law. Calamari and Perillo have
criticized the use of flanking devices like the absurdity doctrine:
[Such] approaches, although producing justice in individual cases were
highly unreliable and unpredictable.
The conflict between what courts said they were doing and what
it was sometimes obvious they were in fact doing has had an unset-
tling effect on the law, giving the sensitive a feeling of lawlessness,
the logician a feeling of irrationality and the average lawyer a feeling
of confusion?1
Karl Llewellyn, principle drafter of the Uniform Commercial Code,
succinctly stated that such "[c]overt tools are never reliable tools."9
Particularly onerous and confusing was the Tumlinson court's use of
hypothetical facts to find absurdity in the Brode-Norfolk contract. The
idea of attorneys and judges spending hours in thought to create absurd
factual situations, so they might win a case or justify a ruling, is itself
absurd. But this is the direction in which Tumlinson leads.
The Tumlinson court could have affirmed the trial court without
considering unconscionability, and without adopting the absurdity
doctrine. Courts require that unless indemnification of a negligent
indemnitee is clearly and unequivocally stated in the contract, it will
88. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLo, supra note 52, at 401.
89. Id. at 400-01.
90. Id- at 401.
91. Id.
92. Id. (quoting K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADrrION 365 (1960)).
11
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not be enforced.' The Brode-Norfolk indemnity provision covered
liabilities "caused" by Norfolk's negligence, but it did not explicitly
include situations in which Norfolk was the sole proximate cause of the
liability. 4 The Tumlinson court could have distinguished between
being the "cause" and being the "sole proximate cause," and could have
ruled that the indemnity provision did not cover the latter situation.
This would have avoided consideration of the absurdity doctrine.
In addition to the issue of unconscionability, there is a serious
question about the Tumlinson court's application of the absurdity rule
in lieu of the plain meaning rule. As previously mentioned, the
Tumlinson court did not discuss whether the absurdity exception to the
plain meaning rule was a "collateral matter"9 5 showing latent ambigu-
ity, whether it was a separate type of ambiguity, or whether it related
to any other common law doctrine. The Tumlinson dissent stated that
there was no latent ambiguity.' This statement, coupled with the
majority's silence about latent ambiguity, leads one to believe that the
absurdity doctrine is -not a type of latent ambiguity.97 The majority's
use of hypothetical facts to arrive at an absurd result clearly indicates
that the absurdity does not "arise upon the face of the document""
within the meaning of patent ambiguity. If absurdity is a latent
ambiguity, the court improperly ignored the plain meaning rule because
the rule does not accommodate latent ambiguity. If absurdity is n6t a
latent ambiguity, then it may be a new, previously unrecognized type
of ambiguity that is an exception to the plain meaning rule.
Regardless of its label, the absurdity doctrine illustrates the
weakness of the plain meaning rule. Absurdity relates to the plain
meaning rule in the same way it relates to unconscionability-as a
flanking device. 9 Rules of law are compromised by such flanking
devices."°  Like many other jurisdictions, 10' Missouri continues to
93. Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. Federal Constr. Corp., 351 S.W.2d
741, 745 (Mo. 1961).
94. Tumlinson, 775 S.W.2d at 251.
95. Campbell v. Dixon, 647 S.W.2d 617, 621 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (quoting
32A CJ.S. Evidence § 961 (1964)).
96. Tumlinson, 775 S.W.2d at 254.
97. Silence often indicates an adoptive admission because "normal human
reaction would [be] to deny such a statement if it were untrue." J. WEINSTEIN,
J. MANSFIELD, N. ABRAMS & M. BERGER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EvIDENCE
688 (8th ed. 1988); see also Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982).
98. J.E. Hathman, Inc. v. Sigma Alpha Epsilon Club, 491 S.W.2d 261, 264
(Mo. 1973) (en banc).
99. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 52, at 401.
100. See id. at 101.
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profess adherence to the plain meaning rule, while covertly finding
exceptions when the rule would reach an inequitable result. The
absurdity doctrine is only one flanking device toward that end; others
may follow, further confusing judges, lawyers, and lay people alike.
The better approach would be to abandon the plain meaning rule.
The Uniform Commercial Code,1° 2 the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts,1'3 and an increasing number of jurisdictions have aban-
doned the rule.04  Professors Corbin,105 Calamari, and Perillo1°
also have expressed distaste for the plain meaning rule. Judge Traynor
succinctly analyzed the rule's weakness:
A rule that would limit the determination of the meaning of a written
instrument to its four-corners merely because it seems to the court to
be clear and unambiguous, would either deny the relevance of the
intention of the parties or presuppose a degree of verbal precision and
stability our language has not attained.1°7
In some cases, as in Tumlinson, the rule even compels courts to invoke
result-oriented exceptions. The result of this rule is inconsistency and
unpredictability.
If Missouri did not adhere to the plain meaning rule, the Tumlinson
court could have reached the same result by applying customs and
usage law. Contracts should be interpreted always in light of applicable
customs and usages.'8 Had there been no plain meaning rule, W. L.
Brode's testimony about the industry-wide usage of indemnity provisions
could have been admitted into evidence properly to prove the meaning
of the Brode-Norfolk indemnity clause in the construction industry.'0 9
This approach would have affirmed the trial court and would have
avoided the issues of absurdity and unconscionability.
101. E.g., Shattuck v. Precision-Toyota, Inc., 115 Ariz. 586, 566 P.2d 1332
(1977); Clemens Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Anderson, 206 Neb. 58,291 N.W.2d 238
(1980); In re Estate of Breyer, 475 Pa. 108, 379 A.2d 1305 (1977).
102. U.C.C. § 2-202 comment 2 (1986).
103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 200-04 (1979).
104. E.g., Pacific Gas Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 69
Cal. 2d 33, 442 P.2d 641, 69 Cal. Rptr. 561 (1968) (en banc); Hamilton v.
Wosepka, 261 Iowa 299, 154 N.W.2d 164 (1967).
105. A. CORBiN, CORBiN ON CONTRACTS: A COMPREHENSIVE TREATISE ON
THE RuLEs OF CONTRACT LAw § 542, at 100-10 (1960).
106. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 52, at 167.
107. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 442 P.2d at 644.
108. E.O. Dorsch Elec. Co. v. Plaza Constr. Co., 413 S.W.2d 167, 173 (Mo.
1967).
109. See id- at 172-73.
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The absurdity doctrine may or may not lead to wholesale changes in
Missouri contract law. If Turmlinson is only an aberration, justice may
have been served without adding confusion to the law. But it is only a
symptom of the plain meaning rule and not a cure. Until Missouri
abandons the plain meaning rule, the absurdity doctrine and similar
flanking devices will be potential weapons for imaginative, enterprising
trial lawyers and judicial activists, and latent dangers for the unwary.
MICHAEL B. HIcKmAN
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